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THE NEW WORLD OF PATENTS 
CREATED BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT 
Martin J. Adelman* 
A decisive shift in the regulation of technology occurred dur-
ing the last days of the Carter administration and continued 
during the Reagan administration. The antitrust laws, which for 
most of the postwar years reigned supreme both in their own 
sphere and as applied to the creation and exploitation of tech-
nology, suddenly were deemphasized. At the same time, the pat-
ent system, which had been relegated to an obscure corner by 
many opinion makers, made a startling comeback.1 
• Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., 1958, M.S. 1959, J.D. 
1962, University of Michigan. The author is indebted to Edmund J. Fish for his valuable 
research and writing in preparing this article. 
1. Indeed, popular magazines now regularly run articles calling attention to the sys-
tem's resurgence. Andresky, A Weapon at Last [pro-patent decisions], FORBES, Mar. 10, 
1986, at 46; Baldo, Juries Love the Patent Holder, FORBES, June 17, 1985, at 147; Mack, 
A Change in the Legal Climate, FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 41; Perry, The Surprising New 
Power of Patents, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 57; Work, Inventors' Just Rewards, U.S. 
NEWS & WoRLD REP., Mar. 3, 1986, at 43. 
Academic opinion toward patents has changed less radically, however. No substantial 
revision in the lukewarm view of patents has taken place in the economics literature. 
See, e.g., DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent Life, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 223 (1985). 
Perhaps the most detailed review of the economic literature relating to the patent 
system is found in Professor Machlup's famous Study No. 15. SuBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., 
AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (Study No. 15 pre-
pared by Fritz Machlup, Department of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University). 
Professor Machlup sums up his argument as follows: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. 
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, 
on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. 
Id. at 80. I have explained elsewhere why the economic analysis Professor Machlup used 
to reach this startling conclusion is erroneous. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market 
Structure, and Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 461-
66 (1982) [hereinafter Adelman, The Supreme Court]; see also Adelman, Property 
Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 977, 987 (1977) [hereinafter Adelman, Property Rights]. 
Nevertheless, there is a modest revival in academic scholarship concerning patents 
that does not emphasize, as did earlier work, the defects of the system. See Caves, 
Crookell & Killing, The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses, 45 OXFORD BULL. 
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The patent system comeback broke a long-standing govern-
mental bias against patents. The Supreme Court had been anti-
patent since the 1930's.2 The Department of Justice had a spe-
cial section of its Antitrust Division devoted to antipatent 
advocacy and litigation,S and to some it appeared that the anti-
trust noose would constantly be tightened;' The FTC, not to be 
outdone, attacked Xerox for building a great company through 
the judicious use of patents. 11 
ECON. & STAT. 249 (1983); Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz & Tirole, Preemption, Leapfrog-
ging and Competition in Patent Races, 22 EuR. ECON. REV. 3 (1983); Horstmann, Mac-
Donald & Slivinski, Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or 
(Maybe) Not to Patent, 93 J. PoL. EcoN. 837 (1985). 
One strongly propatent article from a former Chicago academic is Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977). See also Creel & Win-
tringham, Patent Systems and Their Role in the Technological Advance of Developing 
Nations, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 255 (1984); Lunn, The Roles of Property 
Rights and Market Power in Appropriating Innovative Output, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 
(1985); Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws be Abolished?, 11 J. CoNTEMP. L. 389 
(1985) (concluding that benefits of system outweigh costs); Note, An Appraisal of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301 (1984). But see Jaffe, 
Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R & D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, 
Profits, and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986); Tandon, Optimal Patents and 
Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. PoL. ECON. 470 (1982); Wright, The Economics of Invention 
Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 691 (1983). 
Even law schools are beginning to pay more attention to patents, although the number 
of patent experts on tenured law school faculties remains small. Although my own state, 
Michigan, may be atypical, Michigan's law schools have increased their commitment to 
the teaching of intellectual property law. Wayne State University has entered into a con-
sortium with the University of Detroit and Canada's University of Windsor concerning 
the teaching of intellectual property subjects. Each member school will specialize in one 
area and students will register in their home school for classes offered at the other 
schools. Wayne State is specializing in patent law and has already added a seminar in 
advanced patent law to accompany its basic patent law course. Windsor has instituted a 
new course in trademarks and related unfair competition doctrines and the University of 
Detroit is planning to strengthen its copyright and entertainment law curriculum. In 
addition, the University of Michigan has added full-time specialists in both copyright 
law and in patent and trade secret law. 
2. This trend is carefully described in D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.02(3] (1986). See Sak-
raida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Sal-
vage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969). 
3. The Department's activities are extensively discussed and criticized in Adelman & 
Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: Patent Dynamics and Field-Of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 273, 273-78 (1975). 
4. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705 (1982). 
5. The proceeding was ultimately settled by the entry of a consent decree. See Xerox 
Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975). The implications of the proceeding for innovation policy are 
extensively discussed in Goetz & Schwartz, Industry Structure Investigations: Xerox's 
Multiple Patents and Competition, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: Eco-
NOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 121 (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981). 
An important private antitrust action challenging the acquisition by Xerox of the most 
important patents ended up in favor of Xerox, however. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). 
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The year of 1982 marked the end of the antipatent era. The 
Department of Justice removed itself from the business of pat-
ent bashing.6 The Supreme Court, albeit by a narrow majority, 
decided that the patent laws applied to living organisms7 and 
could be used to create a monopoly in an unpatented product so 
long as that product has no other substantial commercial use.8 
Legislation upgraded the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
and appropriated more money for it.9 Lastly, Congress created a 
new court of appeals, the Federal Circuit, with jurisdiction over 
almost all appealed patent issues. 10 
6. The Department of Justice lost an important case in United States v. 
Studiengesellschaft Koble, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981), but by that time it 
was advocating the position expressed by the Court. See Lipsky, Current Antitrust Divi-
sion Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1981). Studiengesell-
schaf t was a landmark case that embraced a far warmer view of patents than most prior 
cases. See 6 D. DUNNER, J. GAMBRELL, M. ADELMAN & C. LIPSEY, PATENT LAW PERSPEC-
TIVES § 18.6(3.-5) n.31.1 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter D. DUNNER & J. GAMBRELL) for a re-
view of the case. 
7. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that the fact that a 
new organism was "alive" does not take it outside the reach of the patent system). Al-
though the decision was five to four, it still reflected the fact that a narrow majority of 
the Court favored the patent system. Because there was no policy reason whatsoever for 
arguing that a "live" organism, albeit created in the laboratory, for that reason alone 
should be outside the scope of patent protection, Chakrabarty was a relatively pure test 
for how well disposed each Justice was toward the patent system. See Adelman, The 
Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 467, for a thorough discussion of the case. 
8. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201-02 (1980). Although 
this case was also decided by a five to four vote, I do not believe it is a pure test of how 
one views the patent system. The dissenting Justices wei:.e clearly imbued with the anti-
trust theory that a patentee should not be able to control an unpatented product used in 
his patented process even if that product has no other use but to be employed in the 
patented process. This is the leverage theory run amuck, and it infected the dissent. 
Belief in this theory, as misguided as it may be, however, is not inconsistent with a belief 
in a strong patent system. 
9. Power to reexamine patents was granted by the Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1982)). Pub. L. No. 
96-517 also increased funding to the PTO. 
10. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 1295(a)(l) provides in perti-
nent part: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this 
title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress re-
lating to copyrights or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) 
shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title., 
In turn, § 1338 provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action ansmg 
under the Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the 
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases. 
28 u.s.c. § 1338 (1982). 
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The purpose of this Article is to outline the creation of this 
new circuit and to analyze its position on several substantive is-
sues. Part I discusses the origin and power of the Federal Cir-
cuit. Part II analyzes the court's recent decisions on the issues of 
nonobviousness, infringement, inequitable conduct, patent mis-
use, and jury trials. This Article concludes that the Federal Cir-
cuit has in general performed well, but there are areas of patent 
law that must be refined for the court to further its intended 
goals. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND POWERS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
On October 1, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, whose importance may equal or perhaps even exceed other 
acclaimed federal appellate courts such as the District of Colum-
bia Circuit or the Second Circuit, came into existence.11 The 
Federal Circuit was not created solely because the patent system 
was so important that it merited its own court. Rather, the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit was also an outgrowth of the dissatis-
faction with the functioning of both the Supreme Court and the 
federal appellate courts.12 Whatever the reason for its creation, 
11. Commenting on the importance of this new court, Judge Coffin, former Chief 
Judge of the First Circuit, stated that legislation creating the Federal Circuit was "in the 
tradition of the three other major legislative sources of the shape of the judicial estab-
lishment: the Judiciary Act of 1:789, the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, and the 
Judges' bill of 1925." Federal Courts Improvement of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 
678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979). 
12. This dissatisfaction drove Congress and the Federal Judiciary Center to establish 
the Freund and Hruska Commissions. The Freund Report was based on a series of stud-
ies initiated in 1971 by the Federal Judicial Center to analyze the number of cases being 
appealed to federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. The report recommended 
establishment of a national court of appeals to ameliorate the problem. Congress fur-
thered the inquiry with the creation of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Ap-
pellate Court System [hereinafter Hruska Commission]. Although the Hruska Commis-
sion also recommended a national court of appeals, it noted certain areas of federal 
litigation it believed were in need of special attention. These areas were tax, patents, and 
environmental law. 
Excellent histories of these Commissions are found in the literature. See Lever, The 
New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Parts I & II) 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 178, 
243 (1982); Meador, A Proposal For A New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 60 J. 
PAT. OFF. Soc'v 665' (1978); Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982-And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543 (1983); see also COMMISSION 
ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE Svs., STRUCTURE, AND INTERNAL PROCEDURE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) (Hruska Commission 
Report). 
Interestingly, the specific proposal that led to the Federal Circuit included exclusive 
jurisdiction in that court for tax and environmental appeals as well as for patent 
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the Federal Circuit is important for two reasons. First, it is an 
experiment on the much publicized and often belittled idea of 
specialty courts.13 Second, it is a court whose importance argua-
appeals. The proposal that ultimately created the Federal Circuit was issued by the De-
partment of Justice. It proposed an appellate court of national geographic jurisdiction 
over discrete areas of the law. It called for the court to be formed by merging the Court 
of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The court would also have 
jurisdiction over all appeals from district court final decisions in tax cases, patent cases, 
and environmental cases. See Petrowitz, supra, at 550-51 (citing OFFICE FoR IMPROVE-
MENTS IN THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE 
FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM 9, 21, 22 (June 21, 1978) (draft report)). 
It is possible that the Justice Department proposal was based on an article written by 
Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit. The judge noted that a significant problem 
in the federal courts was the conflict of decisions among the circuits in certain areas of 
the law. He commented that appropriate subject matter areas for a new appellate court 
of national. jurisdiction would be tax law, environmental law, securities law, labor law, 
and patent law. Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 
AM. U.L. REV. 881 (1975). 
The former were ultimately dropped, but the patent system got its court, and it need 
not share that court with either tax or environmental law. Although jurisdiction over tax 
appeals from the Court of Claims survived, Congress eliminated exclusive appellate juris-
diction over environmental and civil tax cases from the proposal. The reason why envi-
ronmental and tax jurisdiction was dropped is an interesting question. Special interest 
groups opposed tax and environmental jurisdiction, but certain special interest groups 
opposed patent jurisdiction as well. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981-S. 21 
and State Justice Institute Act of 1981-S. 537: Hearings on S. 21 and S. 537 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
88-110 (1981). 
Some commentators explain the situation by pointing to the problems of intercircuit 
conflicts and "forum shopping" that existed in the patent law. This reasoning seems 
unpersuasive because similar if not equal conflicts existed in tax law and environmental 
law. These conflicts were well recognized as early as the Hruska Commission. Thus, per-
haps patents were singled out for exclusive jurisdiction due to the realization by Con-
gress that a uniform and more reliable patent system was necessary for sustained eco-
nomic growth and to rise to the challenge of Japanese and German industrial 
competition. 
13. In his article, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay 
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 777 
(1983), Judge Posner stated that because of the creation of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, "[p]atent infringement [litigation] will become the most important area 
of specialized federal appellate jurisdiction we have ever had." Thus, the Federal Circuit 
represents an experiment for the idea of specialized courts. 
Specialized courts, however, have been criticized on a variety of grounds. In his article, 
Posner noted eight problems: (1) rapid vacillations in policy due to changing domination 
of the court by opposed schools of thought; (2) increased likelihood of identification with 
government programs; (3) decreased independence from political branches of govern-
ment due to ease of congressional intervention; (4) judicial monopoly resulting in greater 
concentration of government power and a reduction in diversity of ideas; (5) reduction in 
geographical diversity of the federal judiciary; (6) reduction in "cross-pollination" of ju-
dicial ideas from varying substantive areas; (7) potentially serious boundary questions; 
and (8) reduced ability to cope with unforeseen changes in case load mix. See also 
Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 
37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951). 
Significantly, Posner noted that these problems will likely arise in the Federal Circuit 
due to deep "theoretical cleavages" in patent theory over whether patents should be 
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bly rivals or exceeds any other circuit court because of its con-
trol over the patent system. 1 " 
Patent systems are governmental efforts directed at a basic 
defect of capitalistic economies, the inability of inventors or 
their sponsors to capture the value of their creations. In essence, 
a competitive capitalistic economy has a defective engine be-
cause much new technology can readily and cheaply be copied. 111 
In the absence of a legal mechanism to protect the efforts of in-
ventors, investments in such efforts would decrease, thereby sti-
fling innovation. To treat all technology equally and insure that 
the engine will function properly, the United States, as do all 
other capitalistic countries, uses a patent system. 16 Because the 
United States economy remains the most important in the world 
of competitive capitalism, its patent system is the world's most 
important. Because, as I argue, the Federal Circuit appears to be 
in a position largely to supplant the Supreme Court as the court 
controlling the patent system,17 which in turn fuels the competi-
tive economy, it can fairly claim to be an important governmen-
tal institution in the United States. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court may be partially responsible for 
the Federal Circuit. Congress had good reason to be dissatisfied 
with the Supreme Court's history of mishandling patent issues. 
Beginning in the 1930's, the Supreme Court adopted a rather 
construed liberally to stimulate innovation or narrowly to decrease the monopoly power 
of a patent. Posner analogized the ideological differences in patent law to the deep-
seated differences between the Harvard and Chicago schools of antitrust thought. 
Some commentators have argued that the Federal Circuit is not a specialized court 
due to the wide spectrum of cases within its appellate jurisdiction. See Haworth & Mea-
dor, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 
(1978). But see Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 
S. CAL. L. REv. 301, 307 (1984) (concluding that the Federal Circuit "ranks near the spe-
cialized end of the spectrum"). 
14. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
15. Although firms that obtain a free ride on the research and development efforts of 
other companies may always be a few months behind in bringing the copied product to 
market, firms save much time and money by foregoing the costs of having their own 
research team. Thus, they can offer lower prices because there is no investment of 
resources. 
16. In the absence of a patent system, technology that can be protected from appro-
priation by competitors, either under the law of trade secrets (due to its inability to be 
detected and thus copied), or via the structure of the market using the technology, would 
be developed far more rapidly. Thus, technology that is unsuitable for secrecy, such as 
new products, would be produced primarily by monopolies or perhaps oligopolies. Econo-
mists have written countless papers discussing the effect of market structure on inven-
tion, but the beauty of a patent system is that it renders market structure essentially 
irrelevant. Novel, useful, and nonobvious innovations are protected and encouraged re-
gardless of market structure or of the ability to keep the invention a secret. 
17. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
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harsh stand toward patents-an approach that culminated in 
the infamous A & P decision in 1950.18 Congress reacted by pass-
ing a new patent code that for the first time set forth a statutory 
standard for patentability.19 The Supreme Court responded by 
leaving the circuits to determine whether the antipatent days 
were over. Judge Learned Hand wrote some landmark opinions 
for the Second Circuit during this period that promoted patent 
use, but at least some circuits remained hostile to the system. 20 
Finally, in 1966 the Court once again entered the patent field by 
writing a fairly balanced trilogy of opinions involving the proper 
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103, the section governing one ele-
ment of patent validity, nonobviousness.21 Although the trilogy 
seemingly adopted the strict standards that the Court increas-
ingly applied after 1930, the tone demonstrated that the Court 
was certainly no longer blindly antipatent. 22 Shortly thereafter, 
however, the Court returned to its old ways, 23 culminating in the 
creation of the synergism controversy of the late 1970's.24 The 
18. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950) 
(holding a combination patent invalid for lack of invention because the combination 
"merely unite[d] old elements with no change in their respective functions"). Although 
the invention may have radically changed supermarket checkout procedures, the Su-
preme Court said that the patent did not add to the sum total of human knowledge. 
19. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The concept of obviousness first entered 
the law in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). 
20. See, e.g., Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
929 (1961); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 911 (1955); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937 
(2d Cir. 1946). For a historical review of the circuits' approach to patent law, and specifi-
cally the weight given to secondary considerations, see 1 D. DUNNER & J. GAMBRELL, 
supra note 6, § 2.6(2.-2]. 
21. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (consolidating Graham v. John 
Deere Co. (dealing with first patent), and Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co. and Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co. (both dealing with a second patent)); United States v. 
Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966); see also Note, A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobvi-
ousness from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 U. 
M1cH. J.L. REF. 1157, 1165-69 (1987) (discussing the Graham decision in detail). 
22. An example of this tone is found in United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), 
where the Court examined not only the scope and content of the prior art, but also 
mentioned other factors such as the commercial success of Adams's battery, the exten-
sive use of the battery by the government, the invention's assistance to military activity 
and scientific research, and the government's shady business dealings with Adams. 
23. See Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62 (1969) 
("We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, 
it added nothing to the nature and quality of the [invention]."). 
24. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976). Synergism was reinserted into 
the law by Justice Brennan's careless use of language. The idea, if applied seriously, 
would eliminate patents in the mechanical and electrical arts. Ironically, Woodward and 
• Armstrong report that the Supreme Court referred to Sakraida as the "cow shit case" 
(the patent involved a system for removing cow manure from barn floors), and generally 
felt that the case was of no significance and did not even pose an interesting question "in 
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Court was unable to devote the time and intellectual effort nec-
essary to administer properly the patent system. Once again 
many believed something had to be done. That something 
evolved into the creation of the Federal Circuit. 
Of course, certiorari jurisdiction still remains available to a 
losing party in the Federal Circuit. Thus in theory the patent 
system remains under the auspices of the Supreme Court. The 
possibility exists that the Court could attempt to reassert con-
trol.25 In reality, however, the possibility of Court review will 
have little effect on the Federal Circuit's actual control of the 
patent system. The Federal Circuit can establish substantial 
precedent in patent law over a period of years and, by virtue of 
controlling all patent issues, can simply have its way on any seri-
ous dispute with the Court. 26 Moreover, any such dispute be-
tween the Federal Circuit and the Court would provide a fo-
cused dispute for Congress to resolve. The creation of the 
Federal Circuit, due in part to Congress's dissatisfaction with 
the effectiveness of Supreme Court review of patent issues, 
the arcane field of patent law." B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 419 
(1979). In fact, the book suggests that Chief Justice Burger assigned the "cow shit case" 
to Justice Brennan in retaliation for a power play after Justice Douglas retired. More-
over, it is reported that Justice Brennan was so humiliated that he decided to write the 
entire opinion by himself to save his clerks the humiliation of working on the case. Given 
that his careless use of language resurrected the synergism controversy, maybe he should 
have subjected his clerks to the humiliation-perhaps they could have decided the issue 
correctly. Moreover, this episode discloses the distorted priorities of the Court in that 
the minutiae of criminal procedure routinely receive more serious attention than impor-
tant questions of patent law. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after explaining why the notion of syn-
ergism is nonsense in the mechanical and electrical arts, refused to apply it. The Federal 
Circuit has now finally put synergism to rest. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland 
Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
25. The Supreme Court has intervened in one controversy, Panduit Corp. v. Denni-
son Mfg. Co., 106 S. Ct. 1578 (1986), vacating 774 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1985), but did so 
merely to obtain a clear statement of the court's approach under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52. The court responded by fully explaining its reasons. Panduit Corp. v. Den-
nison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2187 (1987). In the 
interim, the court had already carefully explained its approach to Rule 52. See 
Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d. 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1606 (1987) (explaining that each finding of fact was clearly errone-
ous). This has not ended the controversy, however. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 
1164-65 & n.41. 
26. This reality is buttressed by the fact that the Supreme Court, due to a crowded 
docket, is in a position to grant certiorari in very few cases, while the Federal Circuit 
hears a great number of patent cases each year. Furthermore, certiorari may be even less 
likely due to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit ensures uniformity on 
patent issues among the circuits; thus, circuit conflict as a basis for review is now essen-
tially unavailable. 
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makes such a congressional resolution more likely.27 Thus, the 
creation of the Federal Circuit has essentially removed the Su-
preme Court from playing any substantial role in the adminis-
tration of the patent system. 
The Federal Circuit is in the unique position of controlling the 
law that it administers due to its exclusive appellate position 
and control of technical substantive law. For economic and his-
torical reasons, this enviable position may be justified. Unfortu-
nately, this position prevents the structural counterbalances of 
appellate criticism or distinction that so often necessitates a 
grant of certiorari. Thus, the literature may provide a greater 
proportion of solutions for reform than in other areas of the law. 
It is with this reflection that the following analysis of Federal 
Circuit case law is presented. 
II. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT TRENDS 
The uniqueness and importance of the Federal Circuit in rela-
tion to other circuit courts and in relation to the fundamentals 
of our economic system demand attention to its decisions. In the 
years that have passed since the Federal Circuit began function-
ing, the Federal Circuit has moved rapidly toward assuming full 
control of the patent system. 28 Although many of its opinions 
contain extensive dicta,29 it has used that dicta to create a body 
of law quickly. It has substantially changed the law relating to 
patent validity and infringement law. It has given substantial 
guidance on "inequitable conduct" issues, and it has driven ter-
ror into the hearts of potential infringers by requiring either 
that charges of infringement be treated seriously or that com-
pensatory damages be enhanced and attorney fees awarded. 30 It 
27. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 156 was enacted partially in response to Roche Prod. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733 F.2d 898 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
28. The patent decisions of the Federal Circuit are conveniently arranged in Chisum, 
Cumulative Guide to the Patent-Related Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, in 6 D. CHISUM, PATENTS 3-261 (1987). 
29. See SRI Int'! v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (particu-
larly Chief Judge Markey's addendum opinion joined by Judge Newman); Atari, Inc. v. 
JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (jurisdiction and choice of law). In 
each of these instances, at least one concurring opinion has chastised the Chief Judge for 
overusing dicta. See, e.g., Judge Davis' concurrence in Atari, 747 F.2d at 1441 (majority 
opinion unnecessarily broad, suggesting answers to other cases and issues not yet 
considered). 
30, See generally 3 D. DUNNER & J. GAMBRELL, supra note 6, §§ 5.2[2], 5.2[3], 5.2[5]. 
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has striven, albeit mistakenly in some cases,31 to affirm high 
damage awards even where the basis of such awards is question-
able. The court has also attempted to work out the appropriate 
role of juries in patent litigation. 
The Federal Circuit has also moved to clarify its own jurisdic-
tion. In so doing it has clarified its dominant role in patent law, 
and shunned ancillary matters relating to technological develop-
ment that are not formally patent issues. 32 Thus, the court has 
indicated that trade secret, patent antitrust, and patent licens-
ing issues arising in the context of patent litigation will be de-
cided in accordance with the law of the circuit in which the case 
was tried. 33 
In a few areas the court's work is substantially complete. In 
many areas its work is unfinished, and in areas such as patent 
misuse its work has just begun. One can, however, already see 
the effect of the Federal Circuit on the patent system. This ef-
fect may be seen by studying the court's work in the critical sub-
stantive areas of validity, infringement, "inequitable conduct," 
and patent misuse, as well as in the role of juries in patent liti-
gation. This Article studies the court's early approach to these 
vital areas in order to assess where the court has been and what 
its agenda should be. 
31. See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(affirming use of "projected lost profits" to calculate damages). Due to problems of proof 
and a plethora of possible intervening factors, it should not be automatically assumed 
that preinfringement rates of growth will continue. Such a situation seems to call for 
careful appellate review of the evidence presented at trial. 
32. Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit may hear and decide nonpatent issues 
associated with a patent case due to its broad "arising under" jurisdiction, see Rhone-
Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985), it 
follows regional circuit precedent as to the nonpatent issues it entertains. Panduit Corp. 
v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see Atari, Inc. v. 
JS & A Group, 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re International Medical Prosthetics 
Research Assoc. 739 F.2d 618, 620-21 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
The scope of "arising under" jurisdiction has been a perplexing topic in and of itself 
for the Federal Circuit. See also Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 
F.2d 934 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Compare USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) with Atari, Inc. v. JS & A, 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
33. However, the Seventh Circuit in Christianson v. Colt Indus., 798 F.2d 1051, 1059 
(7th Cir. 1986), indicated that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit extends to all pat-
ent iesues even where such issues do not arise in the context of a patent infringement 
action. See also Wyden, 807 F.2d at 936-37. 
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A. Nonobviousness 
The most important section of the Patent Code is section 
103. 34 This section differentiates new developments that are 
worthy of protection from those that must go unrewarded by the 
test of whether an invention would be obvious to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Sec-
tion 103's interpretation is central to the functioning of the pat-
ent system, because if its standards are too high, the incentives 
provided by the patent system are gravely diminished, and if too 
liberal, the public overpays for trivial advances. 
In interpreting section 103, the Federal Circuit has moved 
swiftly to make it more difficult to invalidate patents. In doing 
so, the court has emphasized the importance of the way the 
claim is constructed when a party wants to determine patent va-
lidity. 311 The court has decided that claim construction is to be 
treated as an issue of law based on the claim specification itself, 
the relationship between claims, the patent application's prose-
cution history, and expert testimony.36 Each claim, be it inde-
pendent or dependent, is to be treated separately and attention 
must be paid to each claim of the patent. 37 
The Federal Circuit has reinterpreted the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co.38 so that the so-called 
"objective factors,"39 such as commercial success and long felt 
need, are placed on an equal footing with the three Graham fac-
tors: (1) interpreting the scope of the claims, (2) determining the 
differences between the claims so interpreted and the prior art, 
and (3) determining the level of skill in the art.•0 In essence, the 
34. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), in pertinent part, provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
For a brief discussion of § 103, see Note, supra note 21, at 1161-62. 
35. ACS Hosp. Sys. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
36. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1985); McGill Inc. v. 
John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672-75 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). 
37. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 327 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Gardner v. 
TEC Sys., 725 F.2d 1338, 1339 n.l (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
38. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
39. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538-40 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996-97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
40. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (objective factors entitled to great weight); Strata/lex, 713 F.2d at 1535-38. The 
Graham Court considered evidence of commercial success, failure of others, and longfelt 
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Federal Circuit, in emphasizing objective considerations, has 
adopted the approach to patents taken by Judge Learned' 
Hand."1 
Making a full record of all relevant facts without some uni-
form way to balance them, however, does not decide individual 
cases. Invalidity determinations are mostly inquiries focusing on 
events occurring prior to the invention date, although subse-
quent events may cast light on the pre-invention situation. 
Thus, industry reaction to the invention, such as copying and 
other forms of praise, may be relevant.42 The commercial success 
of the invention may also be a signpost of the nonobviousness of 
an invention in relation to prior art, provided a nexus can be 
shown between the invention and that success. 43 In sum, the 
world's judgment of the inventiveness of the claimed discovery 
may be helpful in determining whether the invention would 
have been obvious at the time of invention to one of ordinary 
skill in the art. 
Jurisprudentially, the problem with determining whether a 
claim is obvious revolves around how to balance and weigh ap-
propriately the various facts bearing on obviousness. Merely 
but unsolved need relevant factual inquiries germane to the obviousness question, but 
labelled them "secondary factors." 383 U.S. at 17. 
In Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985), the court went so far as to suggest that evi-
dence of commercial success alone may require reversal of a finding of invalidity, even 
where the lower court correctly found that "the teachings of the prior ar[t] prima facie 
would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art the claimed invention." See also 
Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1986), where 
the majority, over the vigorous and technically correct dissent of Judge Rich, held the 
patent in suit valid based on commercial success. The court reached this conclusion even 
though the element that made the patented method successful was not disclosed in the 
application as filed. The court viewed the method as inherently disclosed because one of 
ordinary skill in the art would understand that it was there. 
41. Judge Hand was probably the greatest patent judge of this century. See, e.g., 
Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 
224 F.2d 530 (2d. Cir. 1955) (emphasizing objective considerations). 
42. See Windsurfing Int'l v. AMF, 782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 3275 (1986). 
43. To be relevant, commercial success must be shown "to have in some way been 
due to the nature of the claimed invention, as opposed to other economic and commer-
cial factors unrelated to the technical quality of the patented subject matter." Cable 
Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985); accord In re Vamco 
Mach. & Tool, 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This nexus requirement makes sense 
as commercial success can be due to marketing and advertising as much as to a nonobvi-
ous invention. 
Lack of commercialization alone, however, will not support a finding of invalidity. 
Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 327 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Similarly, absent an 
identifiable intervening event, delay in achieving commercial success will not negate the 
probative value of commercial success. Windsurfing lnt'l, 782 F.2d at 1000. 
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spelling out a verbal test does not suffice. Although the law cor-
rectly employs a single verbal test for all technologies, modern 
technologies are sufficiently varied so that they may require dif-
fering approaches toward obviousness and require that the 
group deciding the obviousness question has sufficient experi-
ence in that technological area.44 The Federal Circuit will ulti-
mately develop the necessary approaches to different technolo-
gies because all appeals of nonobviousness determinations will 
be brought before it.411 Thus, although there is a wide difference 
between biotechnology, complex electronics, and inventions in-
volving relatively simple mechanical devices, the Federal Circuit 
will likely develop a sense for when inventions in those technolo-
gies are obvious and when they are not; such a development will 
serve to guide patent attorneys and trial court judges in predict-
ing their decisions. 
So far the court has failed to articulate clearly the policy be-
hind its approach to obviousness determinations. Its decisions 
have been somewhat unpredictable, except for its bias in favor 
of nonobviousness.46 This potential bias flows from the court's 
insistence that patents granted by the PTO are born valid and 
44. For example, the pace of innovation in the electronic and biological arts may call 
for a more heavily weighted emphasis on the "objective" factors because the risk of hind-
sight determinations may be greater. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, 
Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In addition, the volume of arguably relevant prior 
art may make the determination very difficult. Furthermore, complex electronic inven-
tions may call for expertise in that technological area. Laymen may have trouble under-
standing the terms and jargon of the art, let alone accurately comparing and contrasting 
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. 
45. Though Congress acknowledged that exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals 
would result in increasing expertise in the court, it relied upon § 305 of the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act to discourage the President from appointing patent lawyers to 
the court. "This [section] does not prohibit the President from appointing a patent law-
yer to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit .... It does, however, clearly send a 
message to the President that he should avoid undue specialization .... " H.R. REP. No. 
312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1981). On the current court only Judges Rich, Newman, 
and Chief Judge Markey have patent law backgrounds. 
46. Some commentators, including Chief Judge Markey, have denied that such a bias 
exists. These commentators support their assertion by pointing out that of all cases 
reaching the Federal Circuit, roughly 50% of patents challenged are upheld, while 50% 
are invalidated. See Dunner, Federal Circuit Statistics: An Analysis of the Federal Cir-
cuit Box Score, in PRACTICING BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
237 (D. Dunner ed. 1985) (Practicing Law Inst. Litig. & Admin. Practice Series Number 
282). When compared to pre-Federal Circuit percentages (30-40% rate of upholding va-
lidity), however, an ideological shift is apparent. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 
38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 233, 236 (1956) (Table 2). This becomes even more apparent from a 
reading of the court's opinions. For example, the Federal Circuit recently held a bla-
tantly invalid patent valid over a vigorous dissent authored by Judge Rich. Alco Stan-
dard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see supra 
note 40. 
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that the PTO's determination is presumed to have been cor-
rect."" Moreover, clear and convincing evidence of invalidity 
must be put forth by the patent challenger before the court finds 
the PTO's decision of validity erroneous.48 It is no longer suffi-
cient to show that the prior art applied by the PTO was not as 
good as the prior art before the court to overcome the presump-
tion of administrative correctness.49 Under pre-Federal Circuit 
law, such a showing would ordinarily have prompted the court to 
make an independent determination of obviousness because the 
record before the court was different from the record reviewed 
by the PTO.'so 
According to the Federal Circuit, overcoming the presumption 
of administrative correctness merely makes it easier to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the claim or claims are obvi-
ous.111 Although one may question why clear and convincing evi-
dence should be the standard of proof as applied to facts in civil 
cases, the use of this standard is another indication that the 
Federal Circuit wants patents to be taken seriously. The court 
has not, however, clarified the standard once all the underlying 
facts have been decided. In other words, should deference be 
given to the judgment of the PTO on the ultimate issue of law 
once all the underlying facts are determined? If such deference 
is given to the PTO's legal judgment, patents are, of course, 
more likely to be upheld. 
47. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 821 (1984); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a party asserting invalidity has the burden of pro-
ceeding first, the burden of establishing a prima facie case, and the burden of persuasion 
that lasts to final decision). This presumption arises from deference to the expertise of 
the patent office and the notion of administrative regularity. American Hoist & Derrick, 
725 F.2d at 1359. 
48. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983); SSIH 
Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'! Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The 
Federal Circuit is clearly aware of the differences between the beyond a reasonable 
doubt, clear and convincing, and preponderance of evidence standards. SSIH Equip., 718 
F.2d at 371. 
49. American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1360; cf. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984). 
50. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Amerola Prods. Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1025 (3d Cir. 
1976); Kahn v. Dynamics Corp., 508 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
930 (1975). But see Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 532 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) (presumption of validity not diminished by virtue 
of art cited to court but not to the PTO). 
51. American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1360 (presumption of validity not weak-
ened by introduction during litigation of prior art not previously considered by patent 
examiner, but may be more easily overcome); Kalman, 713 F.2d at 773 (burden may be 
more easily carried by evidence of more pertinent art than considered by PTO). 
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Furthermore, such deference would encourage defendants to 
go to the PTO when challenging a patent rather than filing suit. 
Defendants would challenge patents in the PTO due to the inap-
plicability of the presumption of validity during reexaminations 
and therefore the burden on the defendant of clear and convinc-
ing evidence is absent. This exodus from the courts to the PTO 
can occur because the PTO now has the power to reexamine pat-
ents.112 Reexamination increases the authority of the PTO be-
cause it allows the PTO to resume the patent examination pro-
cess on granted patents.113 Such an investigation may be 
instigated by anyone, including a patent challenger or a paten-
tee. Furthermore, the record that the PTO reviews during reex-
amination will be similar to the one made in court. 
Despite the apparent advantage to defendants of challenging a 
patent in the PT0,114 in reality this incentive may prove illusory. 
The Federal Circuit has strengthened the reexamination proce-
dure from the point of view of patentees by indicating that once 
52. Taking effect July 1, 1981, the Patent Reexamination Act comprises §§ 301-307 
of 35 U.S.C. The Reexamination Act grew out of dissatisfaction with the cost and length 
of infringement litigation resulting in a "chilling effect on those businesses and indepen-
dent investors who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to successfully innovate 
and develop new products." H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6460, 6463. The reexamination scheme 
was thus intended to be an efficient and streamlined method where the continuing valid-
ity of a patent could be examined in light of prior art cited by a petitioner. 
53. The reexamination statute allows the PTO to reevaluate the claims of an issued 
patent whenever a substantial new question of patentability arises based on prior art 
patents and publications. This reexamination procedure can be requested by anyone-a 
party to pending litigation, including the patentee, or a third party. 35 U.S.C. § 303 
(1982); see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.501-.570 (1987). 
The procedure works as follows: once a petitioner requests a reexamination of a patent 
in light of certain prior art, the PTO determines if the prior art raises a substantial new 
question of patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (1982). When this threshold is passed, formal 
reexamination is ordered. Formal reexamination closely parallels initial examination. It 
is ex parte, the patent owner may file a statement regarding the newly cited prior art, 
and amendments as well as new or different claims may be offered to distinguish the 
newly cited art. If the patent owner does opt to amend or change his claims, § 307 of the 
Act incorporates the doctrine of intervening rights, which states that a patentee cannot 
recover damages for past infringement where the patentee during reissue or reexamina-
tion amends or changes his claims in any way-unless the substance of the infringed 
claim was in the original patent. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 978 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). 
54. It is argued that this advantage occurs because district courts by statute must 
presume the validity of an issued patent, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), al-
though no such presumption applies during reexamination. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 
(Fed. Cir. 1985); see Note, Examining the Federal Circuit's Position on the Presump-
tion of Validity During Patent Reexamination, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1405 (1986) (arguing 
that for a discrete class of cases, reexamination rather than litigation would be favored 
by infringers attempting to invalidate the patent). The Note also examines the legislative 
and constitutional implications of the Federal Circuit's conclusion. 
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the PTO has reexamined the patent and upheld its validity, the 
challenger must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
PTO was wrong.1111 The challenger thus runs the risk that a re-
view favorable to patentability during reexamination will 
strengthen his opponent's position, particularly because the law 
allows only limited participation by the challenger and does not 
grant a challenger the right to appeal a ruling favorable to the 
patentee in the reexamination. 
B. Infringement 
Infringement questions arise from two basic problems that oc-
cur at the time when claims are drafted. The first is the diffi-
culty of defining at the time of the patent grant all of the ways 
of using existing technology to make or use the patented inven-
tion. The inventor and his attorney frequently err in defining 
the scope of existing technology to be included in the patent 
claims. These errors in claim scope evoke questions as to when, 
if at all, relief from such errors should be granted. The second 
source of difficulty flows from the dynamic nature of technology. 
In some cases, technology not in existence nor foreseeable at the 
time of the patent grant is involved in the infringing device or 
process. The failure of the claims to read on the accused device66 
may be the result of unanticipated developments that cannot be 
literally embraced because of formal requirements embedded in 
the patent laws.67 
American infringement law is based on the notion that the 
granting of a patent puts the public on notice as to what it may 
and may not legally do.68 Thus we do not wait for a court to 
decide during infringement litigation what structures or 
processes are within the patent's scope. Instead, the law imposes 
on the patentee the burden of drafting claims, while imposing on 
the PTO the job of properly examining them for patentability in 
55. Windsurfing Int'! v. AMF Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
56. To "read on" an infringing device means that each element of the claim is found 
in the accused device or process. 
57. A good example of the effect of new technology on infringement questions is 
found in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), where the 
development of microprocessors made the alleged infringing device possible. See also 
Atlas Powder Co. v. E.1. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
58. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891); Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
212 (1853); Wayne Knitting Mills v. Russell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 400 F.2d 964, 968 (4th 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1064 (1969). 
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light of the metes and bounds set out by the claims.119 This re-
quirement on the patentee brings forth the art of the patent at-
torney. Claim drafting is central to the patent attorney's craft 
and is not learned easily. The ability to draft good patent claims 
is a scarce resource, and not all patent applicants enjoy the ben-
efits of a skilled attorney. Hence, a strict application of the doc-
trine that the patent monopoly is defined by the claims inevita-
bly leads, in some cases, to undercompensation or no 
compensation for meritorious inventions. 
The patent statute, however, has long recognized that mis-
takes can occur in the process of claim drafting and permits a 
patentee to correct errors by filing a reissue application.60 The 
reissue procedure simultaneously protects the inventor and ·the 
public by providing for "intervening rights" and by limiting 
broadened reissues only to those who file within two years of the 
issuance of the patent.61 Moreover, under the reexamination 
statute, claim errors can be corrected under the guise of amend-
ing them in view of the prior art when a substantial new issue of 
patentability is presented.62 However, the scope of the patent 
may not be broadened. To do so requires reissue.63 
The common law has created another approach to ameliorate 
the effect of claim drafting errors, as well as the problem of new 
technology. Under what is known as the "doctrine of 
equivalents," courts prior to the Federal Circuit, in circum-
stances not always clearly defined, expanded claims to cover 
products or processes that were literally outside the scope of the 
patent monopoly.64 
59. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention,'' while 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 give the conditions 
by which these claims are to be examined for patentability. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
60. Patents may be reissued to correct errors made without deceptive intent. 35 
U.S.C. § 251 (1982). The Federal Circuit has used its discretion liberally in determining 
when error is shown. Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In 
re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But see In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
61. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1982). The patentee has only two years after the patent issues to 
enlarge an erroneously drafted claim. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1982). 
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (Supp. III 1985); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.525-.565 (1987). 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 251 allows broadened reissues to be filed, if filed within two years of 
the grant of the original patent. See In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
64. The leading modern case dealing with the doctrine of equivalents is Graver Tank 
& Manufacturing v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). This case involved an 
accused product contemplated by the patentee to be within the scope of his monopoly, 
and covered by several of his claims. However, the claims that covered the product were 
held to be invalid for technical reasons, so it was necessary to expand a valid claim to 
996 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
The doctrine of equivalents protects inventors by holding that 
a process or product infringes on a patent even though it is 
outside the literal scope of the claim if it does "substantially the 
same thing in substantially the same way to achieve substan-
tially the same result"-the function, way, result test.66 In prac-
tice, the only disputed issue becomes whether the accused prod-
uct or process functions in the same "way." 
This doctrine, if applied in every case, has the potential to 
overwhelm the peripheral claiming system. If patent infringe-
ment turns upon whether one's product or process does the same 
thing in the same way and achieves the same result instead of 
whether the product or process is outside the literal scope of the 
patent claims, there is no way to determine with reliability prior 
to suit whether or not one is infringing another's patent. Thus 
the public is not notified at the time of the patent grant of the 
legitimate scope of the patent monopoly, and the rationale for 
the peripheral claiming system is undermined. Arguably this has 
been the result of Federal Circuit decisions.66 
In order to preserve the peripheral claiming system, the Fed-
eral Circuit should develop standards for when the doctrine of 
equivalents is available to the patentee. Only by returning to the 
root purposes of the doctrine will meaningful standards be gen-
erated. As it currently stands, a patentee is entitled to enlarge 
his claim to cover equivalents if he can show as a question of 
fact that the accused product or process functions in the same 
cover what was literally outside its scope. Id. at 612. There was no question that a claim 
literally covering the accused product could have been put into the patent that would 
have been free of the defect that plagued the actual claims. Thus, this case was one 
where there was an overwhelming equitable case for expanding the valid claim to cover 
the accused product. The error, however, would also have been correctable under reissue 
at any time since such a rewritten claim would not have broadened the patent. 
65. Id. at 608. 
66. Other than the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, see supra notes 71-75 
and accompanying text, the Federal Circuit has not enunciated any situation where the 
doctrine is not applicable. Moreover, although the court has suggested that the pioneer-
ing status of the invention should be considered in determining the range of equivalents, 
Texas Instruments v. United States Int'! Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1986), equitable considerations relating to the range of equivalents may not be readily 
applied by the courts because the Federal Circuit has indicated that equivalency is a 
question of fact, and thus a question for the jury. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 
767 F.2d 853, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1197 (1986); Radio Steel & 
Mfg. v. MTD Prods., 731 F.2d 840, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Great N. Corp. v. Davis 
Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (recognizing that if the court extends 
the claims under the doctrine of equivalents too far it could destroy the peripheral 
claiming system). · 
Of course, equivalents that expand claims broad enough to be invalid under § 103 are 
not permitted. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984). 
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way, unless precluded by prosecution history estoppel,67 or the 
prior art. However, the doctrine of equivalents was designed 
with a very limited purpose, to prevent fraud on the patent,68 
and not to undermine the peripheral theory of patents. Thus, 
more detailed controls on the doctrine may be appropriate. 
One possible approach would be to limit the use of the doc-
trine to situations where the accused product or process uses 
technology that was not in existence at the time of the patent 
grant, or where the claim limitation that must be overcome was 
required by the formal rules of claiming.69 A more limited ap-
proach would permit the use of equivalents where the accused 
device uses technology not in existence at the time of the patent 
grant to imitate the invention. This approach would only apply 
if the formal rules prevented the claims from literally reading on 
the accused structure or process. 70 
To date, the courts limit the expansion of claims by applying 
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel (formerly "file wrap-
per estoppel").71 The theory of the doctrine is that one should 
not be able to recapture in court what was given up to secure 
patentability during the prosecution of the claims before the 
PTQ.72 
In the doctrine's most expansive form, claim limitations intro-
duced by amendment, even to merely satisfy formal require-
67. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
68. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08: 
[C)ourts have ... recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention 
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the 
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. . .. The doctrine of equivalence 
evolved in response to this experience. The essence of the doctrine is that one 
may not practice a fraud on a patent. 
See also Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1897). 
69. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), was a situa-
tion where new technology made the infringing device possible. The case did not indi-
cate, however, that the accused product could not have been embraced by broad claims 
allowed under formal PTO rules. Ordinarily it is in the area of chemical inventions where 
rules derived from 35 U.S.C. § 112 come into play. 
70. Perhaps the toughest case comes about when the patentee has made a mistake 
and unnecessarily narrowed his claim in a way that could have been fixed by reissue, but 
reissue is either not attempted or is unavailable owing to the two year limitation. The 
Federal Circuit should devote itself to reconciling situations such as this, for only by 
addressing the "hard" cases will the court adequately reconcile the doctrine of 
equivalents with the peripheral claiming system. 
71. The leading modern case on prosecution history estoppel is Exhibit Supply Co. v. 
Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942). 
72. See Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); see also Williams v. V.R. Myers Pump & Supply, 371 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 
1966); Architectural Models, Inc. v. Neklason, 264 F. Supp. 312, 316 (N.D. Cal. 1967), 
aff'd, 397 F.2d 405 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968). 
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ments of the Patent Act, are treated as creating such an estop-
pel. 73 Most courts, even those applying the doctrine expansively, 
have limited its application to amendments added to overcome 
prior art rejections. 74 Thus, in this approach an element added 
by amendment to a claim is treated differently than an element 
found in the claim as originally filed, even though it may have 
been included because of known prior art and even though it 
may have played a role in the ultimate allowance by the PTO of 
the claim. In addition, many courts in the past gave similar 
prosecution history estoppel effect to arguments made by the 
applicant that mention elements originally in the claims. This 
was particularly true of arguments discussing prior art, so as to 
give such discussed elements the same status as elements that 
were added by amendment.711 
This formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel lim-
its the use of equivalents, but does so in a random, unfocused 
manner. The Federal Circuit, though it may have wavered some-
what along the way, seems to have rejected this strict and inflex-
ible approach. 76 By stating that prosecution history can have an 
73. See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gears Works, 355 F.2d 400, 405-06 (1st Cir. 
1965); Hughes Tool Co. v. Varel Mfg., 336 F.2d 61, 64-65 (5th Cir. 1964). 
74. The courts apparently theorized that limitations introduced by amendment to 
distinguish prior art must have been relied upon by the PTO when the PTO granted the 
patent. Thus, the subject matter that lies between the original claim and the claim as 
amended is disclaimed. William Hodges & Co. v. Stewart Corp., 348 F. Supp. 383, 385 
n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see Bushman Mfg. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 380 F.2d 336, 340 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967). 
75. Learned Hand strongly opposed attorney arguments that patents are contracts 
and that the negotiations leading up to them should be used to interpret them. As a 
result, the Second Circuit for many years refused to refer to such arguments. See Catalin 
Corp. v. Catalazuli Mfg., 79 F.2d 593, 594 (1935); Delamere Co. v. Taylor-Bell Co., 249 F. 
Supp. 471, 478 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit has changed its view, Moore 
Business Forms, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 521 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (2d Cir. 1975), 
and in any event such arguments are now routinely, and justifiably, used by the Federal 
Circuit. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d. 861, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Surely if 
an element in a claim is interpreted in a certain way to overcome prior art, that element 
so interpreted should be treated as if it were an amendment. 
76. In Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the 
Federal Circuit stated that prosecution history estoppel may or may not arise from 
amendments made during prosecution of the patent depending on the purpose of the 
amendment. Although Hughes seemed to embrace a flexible notion of prosecution his-
tory estoppel, the court in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985), refused to allow a patentee to expand his amended 
claims beyond their literal interpretation. The court noted that it would not undertake 
the speculative inquiry into the nature or purpose of the amendment. But Loctite, 781 
F.2d at 871, and Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1986) have 
limited Kinzenbaw to its facts, returning to the rule that depending upon the nature and 
purpose of an amendment during prosecution, prosecution history may have a great lim-
iting effect or no limiting effect at all. Thus, although the court wavered along the way, it 
now appears that Hughes is the general rule. 
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effect from zero to one hundred percent depending upon the cir-
cumstances, the court seems to be applying what may be viewed 
as an all-factors approach.77 Although such an approach is less 
formalistic and tends to recognize the common sense view that 
claims are amended for many reasons, it suffers from a lack of 
predictability. It does lend itself, however, to what I believe is 
the proper approach, which is that a patentee should not be able 
to adopt a position in court contrary to that taken in the PTO-
an approach that does require a detailed and painstaking analy-
sis of the actual position taken before the PTO by the patentee. 
In any event, prosecution history estoppel, however defined, 
should not be expanded simply to serve as a brake on a paten-
tee's use of equivalents. Although the doctrines of equivalents 
and estoppel are intertwined, they have different underlying 
roots. Instead of trying to limit the use of equivalents by appli-
cation of prosecution history estoppel, the best approach would 
be to view equivalents and prosecution history as distinct. The 
court should develop appropriate doctrines limiting the use of 
equivalents. 78 It should also continue to limit the use of the doc-
trine of prosecution history estoppel to prevent patentees from 
arguing inconsistent positions in the PTO and in court. Further-
more, the court should assume, when in doubt, that any such 
inconsistent position was important to the decision of the PTO 
77. In Loctite, 781 F.2d at 871 n.7, the Federal Circuit elaborated on the many fac-
tors entering this determination, while attempting to harmonize Kinzenbaw with Hughes 
Aircraft: "The results reached there [in Kinzenbaw] only highlight that application of 
prosecution history estoppel to limit the doctrine of equivalents should be performed as 
a legal matter on a case-by-case basis, guided by equitable principles underlying the doc-
trines involved and by the facts of the particular case." 
78. The court's decision in Texas Instruments v. United States lnt'l Trade Comm'n, 
805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986) suggests that it may be beginning to move in this direc-
tion. Although the court dealt essentially with the use of equivalents under the sixth 
paragraph of § 112, the court concluded its discussion as follows: 
The doctrine of equivalents . . . exists solely for the equitable purpose of "pre-
vent[ing] an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention." To achieve this 
purpose, equivalency is judicially determined by reviewing the content of the 
patent, the prior art, and the accused device, and essentially redefining the scope 
of the claims. This constitutes a deviation from the need of the public to know 
the precise legal limits of patent protection without recourse to judicial ruling. 
For the occasional pioneering invention, devoid of significant prior art ... 
whose boundaries probe the policy behind the law, there are no immutable rules. 
We caution that the incentive to innovation that flows from "inventing around" 
an adversely held patent must be preserved. To the extent that the doctrine of 
equivalents represents an exception to the requirement that the claims define 
the metes and bounds of the patent protection, we hearken to the wisdom of the 
Court in Graver Tank, that the purpose of the rule is "to temper unsparing 
logic" and thus to serve the greater interest of justice. 
805 F.2d at 1572 (citations omitted). 
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in allowing the claim. Such a formulation of the doctrine of 
prosecution history estoppel would appropriately protect the 
public and enhance predictability. 
C. Inequitable Conduct in the Patent and Trademark Office 
Courts for at least twenty years have struggled with the ques-
tions of how and when to punish a patentee for misbehavior dur-
ing the prosecution of his patent.79 The PTO in 1977 formalized 
the duty of applicants, their counsel, and related parties to make 
certain information that a reasonable examiner would consider 
important known to the PTO.80 By requiring disclosure of such 
information, the rule requires courts and the PTO to decide 
when a failure to disclose has taken place, a more difficult deter-
mination than deciding that an affirmative misstatement has 
been made to the PTO. 
In this complicated area, the Federal Circuit generally has 
been effective in developing reasonable positions concerning a 
variety of legal questions involving "inequitable conduct." For 
example, the court has indicated that it will enforce the PTO's 
1977 standard.81 Such a disclosure must be made even where it 
is subsequently shown that the PTO's decision would have been 
unaffected by the nondisclosure. 82 In addition, the failur~ to dis-
close can be the product of gross negligence.83 This requirement 
puts a heavy burden on an applicant to behave honorably before 
0 
79. The modern emphasis on conduct before the PTO began with Walker Process 
Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), although there is earlier Su-
preme Court precedent such as Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1987). 
81. Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10, 14-15 (Fed. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 
1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Patent Office standard is embodied in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. 
82. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
83. The only questionable opinion of the Federal Circuit in the inequitable conduct 
area is Argus Chemical, where the withheld prior art did not render the claims obvious. 
In my view, a reasonable applicant may well have believed that it would not have been 
important to the PTO's decision, particularly because at the critical time there was seri-
ous question as to whether the withheld information constituted legal prior art. In fact, a 
year after the failure to disclose, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals incorrectly 
held that the type of information involved in Argus Chemical could not constitute prior 
art. In re Palmquist, 319 F.2d 547 (C.C.P.A. 1963). The Palmquist decision was criticized 
two years later in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 
(1966). In a subsequent antitrust case, the trial court essentially refused to follow the 
lead of the Federal Circuit, Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 645 F. Supp. 
15 (C.D. Cal. 1986), and the Federal Circuit affirmed, 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987). For 
a thorough discussion of Argus Chemical, see 5 D. DUNNER & J. GAMBRELL, supra note 6, 
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the PTO or risk a finding that its patent, even if valid, is 
unenforceable. 
The court has, however, injected some confusion in the law 
because it holds that once materiality and intent are shown, the 
court, as an issue of law, must balance these two factors to de-
termine whether inequitable conduct has occurred.84 I see no 
reason to conduct such balancing and know of no standard that 
indicates how such balancing is to be done. 
Perhaps the most controversial decision the court has made in 
the area of inequitable conduct is the removal of the need to 
show PTO reliance on the applicant's nondisclosure or misrepre-
sentation. 85 As a result, any attempt to mislead the PTO, even 
one that fails, still renders the patent unenforceable. The court's 
approach here is correct, for the purpose of the inequitable con-
duct doctrine is to discourage certain forms of behavior before 
the PTO. Thus courts must discourage any attempt to misrepre-
sent prior art, even if unsuccessful.86 This rule, though harsh, is 
not unreasonable. Moreover, "inequitable conduct" can be 
purged through confession to the PTO of the behavior. 87 
The court has not, however, been as deft when dealing with 
antitrust suits claiming injuries owing to the issuance of a patent 
procured by fraud or inequitable conduct. Instead of treating 
these cases as important to the administration of the patent laws 
and therefore subject to the control of the Federal Circuit, the 
court has indicated that it will defer to the law of the circuit 
where the district court sits. 88 . 
§ 17.2(1] n.27. Although the court purported to distinguish it, Argus Chemical was effec-
tively overruled in Allen Archery v. Browning Mfg., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
84. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
85. A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1392; Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
86. Some members of the patent bar believe that the reliance element should remain. 
They argue that the purpose of the rule against inequitable conduct is to prevent the 
issuance by the PTO of invalid claims which in turn force the public to use resources to 
invalidate them. Thus if no such claim issues, they reason that no "inequitable conduct" 
should be found. They do, of course, concede that the individual or individuals involved 
should be appropriately disciplined. I, however, believe that the patent law is filled with 
rules that destroy patent rights in what would otherwise be patentable inventions, an 
example being the statutory bars found in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), in order to encourage 
people to behave in a certain way. Hence, I see no principled basis for permitting delib-
erate misrepresentations, or grossly negligent behavior designed to obtain a claim or 
claims, not to destroy the patent rights flowing from that application even if the PTO 
did not rely on such behavior when it issued the patent. . 
87. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). 
88. See American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1365-67. 
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This choice of law preference is probably irrelevant to PTO 
practice because to prove an antitrust violation, it is necessary to 
show that the patent is objectively invalid and would not have 
been issued but for the fraud on the PTO. In addition, the 
mental element requirement is at least as stringent as the intent 
requirement for "inequitable conduct." Therefore, the "inequi-
table conduct" standard is more inclusive and will govern how 
proceedings are conducted in the PTO. 
My major concern is that the Federal Circuit, by def erring to 
the law of the circuits, will fail to reexamine the purpose or ne-
cessity of showing that the patent covers a relevant market. I 
have shown in other writings that patents are monopolies and 
that a valuable patent obtained by fraud will increase the price 
for the patented product or process.89 Thus I see no basis for the 
relevant market requirement. The Federal Circuit, however, has 
already denied that patents create monopolies, probably because 
the word carries a pejorative connotation. 90 In fact, patents cre-
ate desirable monopolies, but they are nonetheless monopolies 
because the first inventor obtains total control of the inven-
tion-even against a subsequent independent inventor. This is 
what monopoly is all about. I hope that the Federal Circuit will 
eliminate this semantic confusion, admit that patents are mo-
nopolies, albeit good ones, and eliminate the requirement of a 
relevant market in section 2 cases. This acknowledgment would 
have the effect of making it even more dangerous to play "fast 
and loose" with the PTO. 
In sum, the Federal Circuit has generally been effective in this 
complicated area. The court's adoption of the Patent Office's 
section 1.56 standard has provided some basis for certainty. This 
certainty has been diminished by the materiality and intent bal-
ance that has been developed by the court, however. The court's 
facially harsh stance on the irrelevance of actual PTO reliance 
on improper conduct is reasonable, but its requirement of a rele-
v~t market in antitrust cases may be improper. 
89. Adelman, Relevant Market Paradox-Attempted and Completed Patent Fraud 
Monopolization, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 289 (1977). 
90. The Federal Circuit has shown little understanding of the fact that patents grant 
11\0nopolies to patentees. Instead the court has asserted that patents merely give paten-
tees property rights. Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But 
see Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
SUMMER 1987) Patents and the Courts 
D. Patent Misuse 
1003 
In contrast to its work in the above areas, the Federal Circuit 
has just begun to develop the law in the area of patent misuse.91 
Here, as opposed to the area of patent-antitrust, the court ap-
parently considers misuse law to be under its exclusive control . 
because it is a potential defense to a claim of patent 
infringement. 
The doctrine of patent misuse was born out of hostility to the 
patent system; it is antipatent in theory and, if blindly applied, 
potentially destructive to the patent system.92 Essentially this 
doctrine has two branches. The first, which may be called sub-
stantive misuse, defines conduct by a patentee that purportedly 
extends the patent monopoly.93 Thus, although rooted in anti-
trust, substantive misuse does not require the patentee to have 
engaged in an antitrust violation.94 Indeed, there are many cases 
where the conduct that is classified as a misuse is expressly 
found not to violate the federal antitrust laws.911 The second, 
which may be called remedial misuse, provides a special penalty 
for the commission of misuse: An infringer, by proving substan-
tive misuse, can obtain a royalty-free license, even when unaf-
fected by such misuse.96 Of course this special penalty is availa-
ble where the acts constitute an antitrust violation, but the 
point is that they need not do so. As a result, trials can be un-
duly lengthened by an infringer alleging acts that affect only 
91. The Federal Circuit has decided two important cases in the area, Windsurfing 
Int'! v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiflbart, 803 
F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In Windsurfing the court suggested that it might apply a 
reasoned economic analysis to the area, 782 F.2d at 1001-02, but in Senza-Gel it contra-
dicted itself by suggesting that it will simply apply Supreme Court precedent un-
tempered by modern economic learning, 803 F.2d at 670. See generally USM Corp. v. 
SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983) for a 
sophisticated judicial analysis of the misuse doctrine. 
92. The antipatent aspects of the misuse doctrine are discussed in Adelman, Prop-
erty Rights, supra note 1, at 1010-13. 
93. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1942). 
94. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969). 
95. A particularly egregious example of a court expressly finding misuse and then 
finding that the same conduct did not violate the antitrust laws is Duplan Corp. v. Deer-
ing Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 594 F.2d 979 
(4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). The case is discussed in 
6 D. DUNNER & J. GAMBRELL, supra note 6, § 18.4(3.-2-2] n.3, § 18.6(2.-5-2] n.15. 
96. This was the actual fact pattern of Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 488, where the in-
fringer was actually using the same tying practice that was found to be a substantive 
misuse when used by the patentee. 
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third parties. 97 Therefore, the Federal Circuit should have made 
an attempt to adopt the position of the Department of Justice 
that misuse, if it must be kept as an additional antitrust remedy, 
should be limited to antitrust violations.98 Unfortunately, the 
Federal Circuit, without attempting any detailed analysis, is now 
saying that because of Supreme Court precedent it must apply 
the remedy of misuse to acts that do not violate the antitrust 
laws.99 
E. Jury Trials 
In my view, there is little room for juries in patent cases be-
cause there is every reason to believe that federal district court 
judges are far better equipped to make accurate findings of fact 
in complicated patent cases than are lay juries. The notable ad-
vantages such judges have include greater intelligence and better 
training, coupled with the ability to control the pace of the trial 
and to study transcripts and relevant documents outside the 
courtroom so as to maximize their ability to absorb the relevant 
facts. 100 Judges also have more time to digest the relevant 
materials after the trial is over. 
97. An example of the abuse fostered by the misuse remedy is found in Ansul Co. v. 
Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). In Ansul the defendant successfully asserted that the 
plaintiff was using an unlawful resale price maintenance scheme in marketing the pat-
ented product. This practice either had no effect on the marketing efforts of the infringer 
or enabled the infringer to compete more effectively against the patentee. Moreover, be-
cause resale price maintenance was lawful in some states and it was used by manufactur-
ers of both patented and unpatented products in their marketing, the fact that the prod-
uct in Ansul was patented may have had little or no relationship to the price 
maintenance scheme found to justify a royalty-free license to the infringer. 
98. Legislation was originally introduced by the Department of Justice in 1983 to 
accomplish this result. It was reintroduced as the Intellectual Property Rights Improve-
ment Act of 1986, S. 2525, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 501 (1986). For an explanation of the 
Department's position, see Rule, The Administration's Views: Antitrust Analysis After 
the Nine No-No's, 55 ANTITRUST BuLL. 365 (1986). 
99. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 670 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
100. I have served as a patent expert in many patent cases and I am almost always 
impressed with the diligence and intelligence of the judges sitting on the federal bench. 
In one case, the judge was getting to his chambers early in the morning to read the 
previous day's transcript. In another, the judge was talking knowledgeably about a com-
plicated area of technology just a few days after the trial began. By way of contrast, I 
have been involved in cases where the trial judge, correctly in my view, had to throw out 
findings made by the jury. Vieau v. Textron, Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1985); 
Calderon v. General Motors Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 782 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
Another reason why judges are inherently superior to juries is that the side with the 
technically weak case has every incentive to use its peremptory challenges to rid the jury 
of any potential juror likely to understand the issues. 
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Some proponents of the use of juries in patent cases argue, 
however, that jury trials are more efficient because the verdict 
comes promptly after trial. These arguments fail to consider 
many of the delays that result from jury trials. Setting aside the 
problems connected to hung juries, the decision of the jury usu-
ally is just the beginning of the process. First, a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict motion is certain to be filed by the los-
ing party along with a motion for a new trial, and the trial judge 
probably spends as much time deciding these motions as she 
would making the appropriate factual findings. 101 Second, there 
is the inevitable difficulty of dealing with appeals based on the 
grant or denial of such motions. 102 In patent cases, this process 
is especially difficult because of the inherent difficulty of sepa-
rating findings of fact from decisions that are labeled questions 
of law in the area of nonobviousness and infringement. 108 
Despite the disadvantages of jury trials in patent cases, how-
ever, the system must continue to live with juries because of two 
decisions that were probably wrongly decided: Beacon Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westover10" and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood. 1011 These 
cases held that juries were constitutionally required whenever le-
gal relief is requested. Because most patent cases include a claim 
for injunctive relief, juries could be substantially eliminated in 
101. In Vieau, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 517, Judge Cohn commented as follows: 
Prior to trial I naively assumed that a jury verdict in a patent trial would 
substantially lessen my work as a trial judge. I was wrong. A patent jury trial 
requires substantially more judicial effort than a bench trial, or at least that was 
so in this case. Not only did I have to constantly deal with evidentiary objec-
tions, I had to instruct the jury initially on the task before them, instruct them 
during trial when it appeared the lawyers lost sight of their presence, and then 
instruct them on the rules of law they were required to follow in their delibera-
tion. I also had to shape a proper verdict form and a multitude of special ques-
tions to assure adequate factual findings. The jury's verdict and answers to the 
special questions were only a station stop. The judicial effort required to decide 
post-trial motions was no less than the effort which would have been required 
had I been the factfinder,. 
102. See Witco Chem. Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 787 F.2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
103. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
104. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
105. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres the court read 
broadly the right to trial by jury. There is doubt whether such a reading of the seventh 
amendment is warranted. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 
80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 337 (1966) ("[C)onsidering the diversity of practice that lies behind 
the seventh amendment it seems unnecessary and undesirable to read the amendment as 
imposing any but the most general limits on the Court's power to make procedural 
changes."). 
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the patent field if the Supreme Court would return to earlier 
seventh amendment law.106 
Because it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will end quickly 
its ill-considered romance with juries, the best hope for control-
ling the use or abuse of juries is to apply the complexity excep-
tion to the seventh amendment right to jury trials in a sensible 
fashion. 107 If that fails, then the Federal Circuit should insist 
that trial judges systematically review jury verdicts. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not declared that it be-
lieves patent trials are too complex for juries to administer prop-
erly, 108 or that the jury's role should be limited to deciding fac-
tual issues with detailed instructions, special questions, or 
interrogatories.109 To make matters worse, the court seems to be 
receptive to the use of juries in patent cases, an attitude that is 
unfortunate for the system's integrity. The court would do far 
better to evince a healthy suspicion towards their use and sug-
gest that the patent system is too important to be subject to the 
inherent irrationality of juries. 110 There is a substantial risk that 
the combination of the right to a jury trial with the court's sec-
tion 103 nonobviousness jurisprudence will enable patentees 
106. See Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (3d Cir. 1969). 
107. Despite many possible arguments against the requirement of a jury, the most 
compelling argument in the context of patent law was addressed in Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531 (1970). The Court indicated that the seventh amendment right to jury trial 
depended upon "the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the 
overall action." Id. at 538. In footnote 10 the Court suggested a three-pronged inquiry: 
"[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger cus-
tom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practi-
cal abilities and limitations of juries." Id. n.10. Some courts have seized upon this last 
point to argue for a complexity exception. See In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079, 1084-86 (3d Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 
79 F.R.D. 59, 66, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 
104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976); cf. Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (1984) (arguing historical 
analysis justifies complexity exception). But see Radial Lip Mach. v. International Car-
bide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 226-28 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (complexity exception rejected in pat-
ent case). 
108. Although the Federal Circuit has not heard a case specifically addressing the 
complexity exception, dicta in SRI International u. Matsushita Electric Corp. of 
America clearly indicates that some judges on the court disfavor any such exception: 
"We discern no authority and no compelling need to apply in patent infringement suits 
for damages a 'complexity' exception denying litigants their constitutional right under 
the Seventh Amendment." 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (addendum opinion by 
Chief Judge Markey joined by Judge Newman). 
109. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell 
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 722 F.2d 193 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
110. See Dual Mfg. & Eng'g v. Burris Indus., 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980). 
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owning objectively worthless patents to obtain large judgments 
from alleged infringers. It would be tragic if the court's desire to 
give patent law the dignity it deserves should result in the sub-
version of the patent system's goal-to encourage the creation 
and exploitation of useful, new, and nonobvious inventions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit, standing at the apex of the patent sys-
tem, is now in a position to improve both the functioning and 
the perceived importance of the patent system. The court's deci-
sions, if misguided, could lead to another historical period where 
the patent system is held in disrepute. Conversely, if it makes 
wise and thoughtful decisions, its activities will serve to preserve 
and even enhance the status that the patent system currently 
enjoys and thereby enhance the functioning of the economy. To 
date the Federal Circuit has functioned to enhance the impor-
tance of the patent system. Nevertheless, as I have attempted to 
show in this Article, there are areas of patent law that remain in 
particular need of concentrated attention by that court. 

